Supreme Court probes Article 25 limits: ruling could redraw judges’ reach

The question of whether courts can forbid public nudity practised as a religious rite has landed before a nine-judge Supreme Court bench, thrusting into the spotlight how far constitutional protections extend for minority faiths. At issue is whether long-standing ascetic customs — notably the naked mendicant tradition of the Digambar Jains — fall outside judicial review unless they breach narrowly defined constitutional limits.

During hearings, the Travancore Devaswom Board, through senior counsel A.M. Singhvi, urged the bench to confine judicial scrutiny to the exceptions listed in Article 25 — namely public order, health and morality — and to avoid substituting the court’s view of propriety for a community’s sincere religious convictions. The submissions questioned whether courts should assess if a custom is an “essential” religious practice at all, or only test it against those constitutional parameters.

Singhvi told the court that even practices widely regarded as offensive by general social standards may be protected when they form a recognized core of a faith. He pointed to the Digambar tradition of public nude existence and movement as an example of a rite that, he argued, should not automatically be vulnerable to invalidation under Article 25.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta reinforced that point by drawing a parallel to other Indian and South Asian ascetic traditions. The bench was referred to a recent decision by Nepal’s Supreme Court, delivered last September, which rejected a petition to bar naked Naga sadhus from entering Pashupatinath temple during Mahashivaratri. The Nepal court distinguished mere nudity from obscenity, holding that religiously mandated nudity — and long-established ritual practices — cannot be treated as automatically offensive or obscene.

The Nepal ruling explains why this matters beyond theory: it framed nudity as a physical condition, not necessarily an erotic or shameful act, and protected rituals with deep historical roots from blanket prohibition. That reasoning was advanced before India’s bench to illustrate how a court can respect religious traditions while still policing public safety and decency under constitutional limits.

• Key legal questions the court is examining:

  • Should courts determine whether a custom is an “essential” religious practice?
  • Are judicial inquiries into religious practices limited to threats to public order, health and morality under Article 25?
  • When, if ever, can state laws on public nudity and obscenity override a community’s bona fide religious belief?

• Practical stakes: the ruling could clarify whether minority ascetic traditions receive constitutional protection, reshape enforcement of public decency laws, and set precedent for how courts treat the internal beliefs and practices of religious communities.

Senior counsel argued that an external adjudicator has limited authority to second-guess what a religious community considers central to its faith, and that the community’s own sincere belief should carry decisive weight unless it triggers a constitutional exception. That position frames the dispute as one about judicial competence and deference as much as about religious freedom.

The bench, headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant, pressed persistent questions about how to balance individual and collective liberties with communal sensibilities and public safety. Its eventual ruling will likely set a national standard for when, and how, courts may probe the substance of religious customs — a decision with consequences for other faith-driven practices that sit uneasily with mainstream social norms.

Whatever the outcome, the case puts a sharper focus on how constitutional protections for religion interact with state power and social norms. For devotees and administrators, the court’s reasoning will determine whether centuries-old rites receive robust constitutional shelter or whether they may be curtailed when they conflict with contemporary notions of order and decency.